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Iraq War Logs · Field report

(EXPLOSIVE HAZARD) IED FOUND/CLEARED RPT (Improvised Explosive Device (IED)) %%% IP, %%%/A/- : %%% INJ/DAM

Report date 2009-09-20 09:09 · Published by WikiLeaks on 22 October 2010 · View original report »

Reference IDRegionLatitudeLongitude
IRQ20090920n105MND-N3643.3
DateTypeCategoryAffiliationDetained
2009-09-20 09:09Explosive HazardIED Found/ClearedENEMY0
EnemyFriendCivilianHost nationTotal
Killed in action00000
Wounded in action00000

Report text

/ :%%%\012\012WHO: %%% IP, %%%/A/-%%%\012\012WHEN: 200954SEP09\012\012WHERE: Ninewah Province, , %%%\012\012WHAT: IED - Ineffective - Confirmed, /-%%%\012\012HOW: %%% IP report 2x IED'%%% IVO , %%%/A/-%%% arrived on scene and confirmed the IED. %%%, route %%% team arrived on scene and began their assessment of the IED. %%% set up on the west side of the IED while %%%/A/-%%% was on the east with the IO, CPT %%% of the %%% IP. The IED was reported to be a metal %%%" x %%%" pipe with wire leading to a metal plate and another pipe under the plate in a plastic bag. %%% moved the plate to identify the second canister. Due to the restrictions on route %%% to detonate the IED containing HME they were not able to continue their investigation. EOD arrived on scene, after completing their assessment of the IED they called up a request for a blast window. After completing the post blast %%%, EOD reports that the IED contained %%% each "%%%" pipes, det-cord but no initiation system found . EOD RTB, %%%/A/-%%% continued mission.\012\012BDA: None\012\012S2 Assessment: At %%% IPs reported %%% possible IEDs IVO %%%. IED was reported to be to be two pipe bombs with Det Cord, however no initiator was found. Assessing that the IEDs were in the first stage of %%%, with the initiator to be attached at a later time. Yesterday morning, Apache -%%% was targeted by an IED %%% on a bridge consisting of approximately %%% LBs of UBE and command wire initiator. This IED TTP has been consistent with a %%% TTP seen along routes East of Ash %%% and in and around the %%% bridge site. Previous Recent IEDs and IDF attacks linked to %%% have picked up over the past month, targeting USF forces along an assessed supply line. Recent increase in attacks have shown '%%% reaction to combat operations disrupting insurgent supply routes within AO Charger.\012\012EOD Assessment: Team -%%% responded to an IED IVO %%% ISO A / -%%% CAV. Team set up safe area at %%%. The team was notified that Engineers on scene confirmed the IED and were unable to dispose of it due to the composition of the IED. The team performed a remote reconnaissance and found %%% each Pipe Bomb ("%%%") on the north side of the road. No initiation system was found. The IED was disposed of in place by controlled detonation. The team then performed an armored reconnaissance and found an additional %%% each Pipe Bomb that was %%% meter from the first pipe bomb. The end cap had been blown off of it from the previous blast and no initiation system was found. Team leader estimates the pipe bombs contained %%% lbs ..%%%. each. The second pipe bomb was collected and transported back to the SHA. No other hazards were found.\012\012///CLOSED///%%% 2205C Sep %%%

Reproduced as published by WikiLeaks. “%%%” marks text that WikiLeaks redacted before publication.

Report keyD7FD2BC3-CBFB-7779-A266D8E1EE5198EB
Tracking number20090920095438SLE
Attack onENEMY
Reporting unitMND-NORTH OPS LNO
Unit nameNimrud IP, 3/A/1-12
Type of unitISF
Originator groupMND-NORTH OPS LNO
Updated by groupMNC-I SIGACTS MGR
MGRS38SLE49
DColorRED