(EXPLOSIVE HAZARD) IED EXPLOSION RPT (Improvised Explosive Device (IED)) -%%% CAB IVO (ROUTE %%%/CROWN ROYAL): %%% INJ/DAM

MND-%%% EVENT %%% \012\012UNIT: -%%% CAB/ -%%%\012\012IED TYPE: UNK\012\012KIA (/%%%): NONE\012\012WIA (/%%%): NONE\012\012EQUIPMENT BDA: UNK\012\012ENEMY BDA: NONE\012\012ENEMY DETAINEE: NONE\012\012CREW SYSTEM: %%%/A\012\012OTHER IED DEFEAT EQUIP: %%%/A\012\012%%% DOOR KIT INSTALLED: %%%/A\012\012%%% OF PATROL: UNK\012\012WHO: -%%% CAB\012\012WHAT: IED DETONATION\012\012WHERE: %%%\012\012CLOSEST ISF/SoI CP:\012CP #: %%% CP\012UNIT: %%%\012GRID: %%%\012MANNED/UNMANNED: MANNED\012DISTANCE: %%% NORTH\012\012: %%%\012\012SECT ASSESSMENT: UNK\012\012INITIAL REPORT: %%% JOC REPORTS IED STRIKE AGAINST %%% AT %%%\012\012TIMELINE: \012\012: %%% JOC REPORTS IED STRIKE AGAINST %%% AT %%% AT THE INTERSECTION OF RTE %%% AND RTE %%% ROYAL, NO REPORTS OF INJURIES AT THIS TIME\012\012: %%%/A/-%%% AND EOD SP COP APACHE\012\012: %%%/A/-%%% AND EOD ARRIVE ON SITE TO CONDUCT POST BLAST ANALYSIS\012\012: %%%/A/-%%% AND EOD RP COP APACHE \012\012EOD ASSESSMENT: A DETONATION WAS REPORTED IVO %%% AFTER A CONVOY OF IA VEHICLES PASSED UNDER THE OVERPASS OF . %%% AND %%% AT APPROXIMATELY 0815C. INITIAL REPORTS STATED THE AREA WAS CORDONED OFF WITH IA/%%% VEHICLES AND THAT THE DETONATION CAUSED NO CASUALTIES OR DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLES. UPON ARRIVAL OF CF SECURITY AND EOD TEAM TO SPECIFIED GRID, NO BLAST SEAT OR CORDON COULD BE FOUND. AFTER CONSIDERABLE SEARCHES AND QUESTIONING OF SURROUNDING IA/ %%%. TEAM ESTABLISHED SA AT %%% AND SWEPT FOR SECONDARY DEVICES. AFTER NO FURTHER EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS WERE FOUND, TEAM PROCEEDED WITH PBA. THE %%% CP PERSONNEL CLOSEST TO THE BLAST SEAT STATED THE IA CONVOY PASSED UNDER THE OVERPASS ON RT. %%% AND THE DEVICE DETONATED AFTER THE CONVOY WAS APPROXIMATELY %%% NORTH OF OVERPASS WHILE TRAVELING IN THE NORTH BOUND . , %%% OF VEHICLES/PERSONNEL, AND CONVOY INTERVAL ARE UNKNOWN SINCE NO PERSONNEL FROM THE IA CONVOY WERE %%%. BLAST SEAT MEASURED APPROXIMATELY %%% X %%% AND WAS LOCATED IN A SMALL DITCH THAT RUNS PARALLEL TO THE ROAD ON THE NORTH BOUND RIGHT HAND SIDE OF RT. %%%. ESTIMATED AMOUNT OF EXPLOSIVES USED IS APPROXIMATELY 5LBS OF UBE WITH METAL BALL BEARINGS FOR FRAGMENTATION. DEVICE WAS LOCATED %%% NEXT TO THE NORTHERN BRIDGE PILLAR (MOST LIKELY USED AS AIMING POINT AS WELL) AND MISTAKENLY %%% WITH THE BALL BEARINGS FACING %%% INSTEAD OF TOWARD ROAD TRAFFIC. NUMEROUS IMPACT POINTS WERE OBSERVED ON THE BOTTOM OF THE OVERPASS WITH MINIMAL DAMAGE. CONTAINER AND INITIATION SYSTEM ARE UNKNOWN BUT IT IS PRESUMED A COMMAND INITIATED %%% TYPE DEVICE. TEAM LEADER ESTIMATES THE CONVOY WAS TRAVELING TO FAST FOR THE %%% TO PROPERLY TIME DETONATION. TEAM RECOVERED %%% BALL BEARINGS AND A SOIL SAMPLE TO BE TURNED OVER TO WIT %%% FOR FURTHER EXPLOITATION. NO FURTHER EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS OR INITIATION DEVICES WERE FOUND.\012\012IO MESSAGE: THOSE WHO SET ROADSIDE BOMBS %%% BY THE ISF AND THE CF. HELP STOP THE CRIMINALS IN THE SPECIAL GROUPS, CALL IN TIPS ON\012\012S2 ASSESSMENT: THIS ATTACK WAS MOST LIKELY CONDUCTED BY THE SAME GROUP AS YESTERDAY. THEY HAVE SET A DISTINCT PATTERN THESE PAST TWO DAYS. THEY ARE MOST LIKELY OPERATING IN THIS AO DUE TO THE %%% ATTITUDE OF ISF IN THIS AREA MAKING THE ISF A SOFT TARGET. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THIS COULD BE THE %%% RCIED CELL CONDUCTING THESE ATTACKS, WHO HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO OPERATE WITH AND HAVE BEEN LINKED TO THE %%% 57MM ISF INTIMIDATION CELL.\012\012SUMMARY: \012\012%%% X IED STRIKE\012%%% X INJ\012%%% X DMG\012\012//CLOSED//%%%