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SECRET

GEORGIA: CESIUM-137 SOURCES RECOVERED NEAR KOPITNARI AIRPORT

US diplomatic cable 09TBILISI449 · Georgia Tbilisi · 2009-03-06 14:37 · Read at WikiLeaks PlusD »

Reference ID09TBILISI449
Created2009 March 6, 14:37 (Friday)
OriginGeorgia Tbilisi
CountryGeorgia
ClassificationSECRET
ToCentral Intelligence Agency; Department of Energy; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Group Destinations European Political Collective; Joint Chiefs of Staff; RHMFISS US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC; RUEANFA NRC WASHINGTON DC; RULSDMK NSA US WASHINGTON DC; Secretary of Defense; Secretary of State; United Nations (Vienna)
TAGSASEC - Administration--Security GG - Georgia KCRM - Criminal Activity KNNP - Nuclear Non-Proliferation MNUC - Military and Defense Affairs--Military Nuclear Applications PARM - Political Affairs--Arms Controls and Disarmament PINR - Political Affairs--Intelligence ZJ - Transcaucasus
Character count5,239

Cable text

SECRET S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000449 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2019 TAGS: MNUC, ASEC, PARM, PINR, KNNP, KCRM, ZJ, GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: CESIUM-137 SOURCES RECOVERED NEAR KOPITNARI AIRPORT REF: A. STATE 17212 B. TBILISI 00314 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D 1. (S) Summary. On Thursday, February 26, the recovery of four Cesium-137 sources, discovered near the Kutaisi-Samtredia central highway (ref B), was successfully accomplished by a joint MOIA and Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service (NRSS) team. Officials from NRSS had assumed that there was just one source present, however, the team recovered four Cesium-137 sources. They were safely transported to the storage facility in Mtskheta. As requested ref A, additional details regarding the excavation and the sources are detailed below. End summary. INITIAL RESPONSE 2. (S) In response to the inadvertent detection of elevated radiation level against the background level off of the Kutaisi-Samtredia central highway near the town of Samtredia through the use of a USG-donated pager (mini rad-D, serial number 105786) by Georgian customs officers, NRSS sent two field missions, on February 10 and 12, in cooperation with local authorities and the Emergency Response Department of the Ministry of Interior. The teams took measurements to identify the risk level, identified the safety area, installed indicators and informed the appropriate authorities of their findings. An immediate removal without a special operation was deemed impossible due to the high dose rate of what was determined to be Cesium-137. At this point, it was assumed to be just one source. Relevant IAEA divisions were formally notified of the discovery. PLANNING AND RECOVERY 3. (S) NRSS, jointly with the Emergency Services Department, elaborated a recovery operation plan. They determined they would need fifteen to seventeen people to conduct the operation, and each person could be exposed to the source for no more than ten to twelve minutes. The source was assumed to be in solid state, however, they did plan for the contingency that the source was not solid. Necessary medical examinations of the recovery team and off-site training were held. Due to both the need for planning and weather conditions, the recovery operation was delayed until February 26. They began the excavation at 1100 and concluded at 1445 local time. The recovery was accomplished by both machine and manual means. A backhoe was used to initially excavate small amounts of dirt, which was then transferred onto a sheet and checked for elevated radiation levels. If elevated levels were found, then the dirt was manually separated. During the operation, four separate Cesium-137 sources were discovered, compactly buried under approximately thirty centimeters of soil. According to an NRSS official, it appeared that the sources had simply been discarded there. All were in solid state with no destruction. No container was present, and all but one source was completely caked in mud. The one not covered in mud was considered to be an odd shape, described as a bowler hat. Each was onlya few centimeters in size. Initial estimated measurements of activity indicate that one source had activity of about three Qactivity indicate that one source had activity of about three Ci and the three others were all less than one Ci. The sources were transported by vehicle in a source storage container to the storage facility in Mtskheta. Further analysis has not yet been conducted. Officials promised to provide poloff with any details of analysis that is conducted, as well as pictures of the sources. LOCATION AND ORIGIN 4. (S) The location of the site is four to five kilometers east of the town of Samtredia, twenty kilometers west of Kutaisi and fifty meters from the highway. There have been no prior incidents of this nature near this site. There is no permanent presence of humans in the immediate risk area and it was determined that there was no significant risk of past exposure at the location. An aerial survey conducted together with the IAEA in 2000 covered this location, but showed no traces of the presence of the source at that time. In addition, the sources were discovered next to a transformer installed four to five years ago. Due to these TBILISI 00000449 002 OF 002 facts, NRSS officials estimated that the source was probably abandoned at this site about two or three years ago. NRSS informed poloff that such cases with orphan sources are usually linked with former Soviet military equipment, or on rare occasion, with former industrial gauges. However, at this time, they have no indication of the origin of the sources and are not optimistic that they will ever obtain such information. It is not currently being handled as a criminal case. 5. (U) Pictures of the site and recovery operation have been emailed to EUR/CARC. Poloff will continue to follow-up on this incident and will report any further information. Please contact Nicole O'Brien on obriennl@state.sgov.gov with any questions. TEFFT

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