(S) M/V ANNE E SHIPMENT OF ANHYDROUS HYDROGEN FLUORIDE FROM THAILAND TO IRAN

SECRET S E C R E T STATE 042958 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2033 TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, TH, KS, TC, XB, XC, XE SUBJECT: (S) M/V ANNE E SHIPMENT OF ANHYDROUS HYDROGEN FLUORIDE FROM THAILAND TO IRAN REF: A. A. STATE 3743 B. B. ABU DHABI 52 C. C. ABU DHABI 70 D. D. ABU DHABI 178 E. E. HINES-SIDLER E-MAIL F. 1 APRIL 2008 Classified By: ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney, Reasons 1.4 (b), (c), and (d) 1. (S) SUMMARY and ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to approach appropriate Thailand officials to follow up regarding a shipment of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF) from Thailand to Iran via Dubai. Post is requested to ask Thai officials for permission to release information regarding the South Korean firm to the ROKG. End summary and action request. ---------- BACKGROUND ---------- 2. (S) In January 2008, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)-controlled Liberian-flagged M/V Anne E on IRISL Persian Container Line (PCL) voyage 8237 loaded a very large shipment of Chinese-origin anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF) at Laem Chabang, Thailand for delivery to Bandar Abbas, Iran. The vessel was scheduled to call at Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE) on 14 January 2008 for final delivery to Bandar Abbas, Iran on 15 January 2008. 3. (S) AHF is an Australia Group-controlled chemical weapons precursor and is included in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) gas centrifuge and reprocessing watchlists (for items that would be subject to "catch-all" controls for nuclear purposes), that the U.S. has shared with the NSG. AHF is also used in the uranium conversion process to make uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) which is a precursor to making uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the feed stock for a gas centrifuge. It also has applications in the refining of uranium, the production of fluorine and aluminum fluoride, and as an addition in liquid rocket propellants. 4. (S) On 14 January 2008, Emirati officials detained the cargo, and have been holding it ever since (Refs B, C). The UAE has expressed a desire to have the shipment recalled. (Ref D). ---------- OBJECTIVES ---------- 5. (S) Post should: -- Request permission to share information regarding the South Korean firm involved in this transfer, the Foo Sung Corporation, with Republic of Korea officials -- Emphasize that United Arab Emirates (UAE) officials are anxious to have the shipment recalled and disposed of as soon as possible, and that Thai cooperation in this matter will facilitate this effort. -- Note our concern that these items could be used in Iran's nuclear or chemical weapons programs, and therefore are proscribed pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803. -- Express our appreciation for Thai officials' ongoing cooperation with regard to this shipment. -- Thank Thai officials for investigating this matter and sharing the results of their investigation with us. -- Express US interest in continued close cooperation on proliferation issues. ----------------------------- REPORTING REQUIREMENT AND POC ----------------------------- 6. (U) Please report delivery of demarche and any immediate response by 28 April. 7. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up information is Mark Felipe, (202) 647-5376, felipem2@state.sgov.gov. Please slug all responses for ISN, T, EAP, and NEA. Washington appreciates Post's assistance. RICE NNNN End Cable Text