IRAN -- PRESSING INDONESIA ON YUDHOYONO'S TRIP

SECRET S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000462 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR P, T, EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, ISN, ISN/RA NSC FOR EPHU (RANA/STUKALIN), NEA, NEA/IR E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2018 TAGS: PREL, PARM, KNNP, UNSC, ID, IR SUBJECT: IRAN -- PRESSING INDONESIA ON YUDHOYONO'S TRIP REF: A. STATE 22379 B. JAKARTA 421 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Cameron Hume, reasons 1.4 (b+d). 1. (S) SUMMARY: Ambassador Hume in a March 6 meeting with Ambassador Alwi Shihab urged that President Yudhoyono use his upcoming trip to Tehran to press Iran to meet its nonproliferation obligations. He also urged Indonesia to support Kosovo at the upcoming OIC Summit. Shihab explained that although Indonesia abstained on UNSCR 1803 for domestic political reasons, it would press Iran on nonproliferation issues. Shihab concluded by saying that he looked forward to meeting U.S. Special Envoy to the OIC Sada Cumber at the Summit in Dakar. END SUMMARY. 2. (C) Ambassador Hume discussed President Yudhoyono's planned March 10-12 trip to Iran with former foreign minister and Presidential Special Envoy for the Middle East Alwi Shihab on March 6. Shihab, a key player on Indonesian Middle East policy, will accompany Yudhoyono to Iran and then to the OIC Summit in Dakar. IRAN 3. (S) Per Ref A, The Ambassador underscored the importance of using SBY's Iran trip to press Tehran to comply with all of its UNSC nonproliferation obligations and to cooperate fully with the IAEA. He told Shihab that Yudhoyono should urge Iranian leaders to take advantage of the P5 1 offer to provide Iran with nuclear fuel. This arrangement would facilitate Iran's peaceful use of nuclear energy while also satisfying the international community's proliferation concerns. The international community had given Iran a way forward. Iran should take it. 4. (S) Shihab, who had met President Yudhoyono regarding the Iran trip earlier in the day, responded that Indonesia agreed that Iran must meet its nonproliferation obligations and that President Yudhoyono would press his Iranian interlocutors on this point. Shihab explained that President Yudhoyono decided to abstain on UNSCR 1803 due to domestic political concerns, particularly--with elections looming in 2009--the storm of criticism that would likely come from the legislature (DPR) had Indonesia supported the resolution. Shihab explained that the DPR's criticism of President Yudhoyono following Indonesia's support of UNSCR 1747 was essentially the first time in Indonesian history that an administration was called to account before the DPR on a foreign policy matter. 5. (S) Shihab assured the Ambassador that this domestic political calculation did not diminish Indonesia's commitment to international nonproliferation. He added that President Yudhoyono had instructed his staff to take particular steps to prevent the Iranians from using his visit for propaganda purposes. 6. (S) The Ambassador also cautioned Shihab regarding possible Indonesian cooperation with Iran on a proposed fertilizer project in Aceh and an oil refinery in Banten, West Java. The financing of these deals, particularly with Iranian state-owned bank participation, could potentially violate UN sanctions targeting Iran. 7. (S) Shihab replied that Indonesia continued to study the proposed projects with Iran to determine if they could go forward. Indonesian banks were already concerned that they might be subject to sanctions if they are involved in financing the projects. Shihab hoped that the proposed projects would give Indonesia some leverage with Iran. He said that President Yudhoyono would press Iranian leaders by saying they need to show "flexibility" on the nuclear issue in order for Indonesia to go ahead with projects that are in the interests of both countries. KOSOVO JAKARTA 00000462 002 OF 002 8. (C) The Ambassador also urged Indonesia to show solidarity with Kosovo at the upcoming OIC Summit, which Yudhoyono will also attend. Indonesia, the Ambassador said, should recognize Kosovo, as the United States and our European partners and other OIC countries have already done. 9. (C) Shihab responded that Indonesia was sympathetic to Kosovo and that much of the Indonesian public--especially Muslims--supported Kosovo's independence. He noted, however, that nationalist politicians--particularly PDI-P leader Megawati Sukarnoputri--were opposed to any gesture that might lend legitimacy to separatist movements in Indonesia. Because of these domestic political factors, President Yudhoyono favored waiting until more countries, especially in Europe, had recognized Kosovo. OIC 10. (SBU) The Ambassador also informed Shihab that the President had recently appointed Sada Cumber as U.S. Special Envoy for the OIC. He encouraged Shihab, and other members of the Indonesian delegation to the OIC Summit, to meet Cumber. Shihab welcomed Cumber's appointment and said that he looked forward to meeting him in Dakar. HUME