(EXPLOSIVE HAZARD) IED EXPLOSION RPT (RCIED) 242ND EOD : 1 CIV KIA

Following incident (2008-033-), RCP 9 responded to a second IED strike which damaged a jingle truck carrying building materials in route to OBJ NOW. Upon arrival, the Husky was used to search for metallic signatures, which had negative finds. After the Huskys search, the EOD Team dismounted and cleared the area for secondary devices and began their Post Blast Analysis. Components recovered at the scene were a PMR (Brand Name: Uniden), a Lithium Battery and white electrical wire. The Lithium Battery appeared to be a modified BA-5598/U, which may have been discarded by US Forces. While the team conducted the Post Blast of the RCIED, RCP 9s interpreter questioned locals and ANP that stated the driver of the vehicle sustained no injuries, but the passenger was killed in the blast. The driver, who was still on scene, stated he bypassed the initial IED explosion, but when he failed to stop for armed gunman south of Maktaab, his vehicle was struck by an IED. The crater left by the IEDs main charge was 84 in wide and 24 in deep. Based on the dimensions of the crater, lack of fragmentation, and frequent use of plastic anti-tank landmines in Khost, the main charge is suspected to be an Italian TC-6 AT, Landmine. Upon completion of the RCP mission and return to FOB Salerno, all components were turned over to CEXC for further exploitation. *** FM TF PALADIN DEVICE CONSTRUCTION AND METHOD OF OPERATION a. (S//REL) The PMR radio had been modified to act as an RCIED firing device through the addition of what is a probable a DTMF decoder board attached to the back of the PMR. The operator would activate the device by first connecting an additional power source (battery pack) to the probable UNIDEN PMR DTMF decoder board. At this time the operator would connect the blasting cap to the PMR output wires, and insert the blasting cap into the main charge. When ready to initiate the device, the operator would transmit the arming and firing code from another UNIDEN PMR. The PMR provides the RC carrier wave, with the attached DTMF board providing the firing code DTMF decoding. On closing the firing relay, enough power output is exported from the attached battery pack, through the output wires, to the blasting cap, detonating the main charge. b. (S//REL) The probable method of operation was for the INS to emplace this device in an effort to target ANSF personnel/vehicles. The device is connected to the main charge buried in the road with the PMR camouflaged from view along the side of the road. The device was detonated when the victim failed to stop his vehicle for armed men along the route. In this case the IED had been used as a probable INS cut off for an illegal vehicle check point. INVESTIGATOR''S COMMENTS a. (S//REL) The components and construction of this device are almost identical to those found in CEXC_A_1001_07, discovered immediately adjacent to the Afghanistan/ Pakistan border. No exploitation was performed on the components in that case, as they were turned over to the Pakistani military. Photographs taken shows that the PMR/modification as well as the power connector and wires appear to be of the same manufacture. The battery used in CEXC_1001_07 was a modified pack consisting of four (4x) individual cells contained in a plastic wrapper. Close examination of the 5598A/U battery recovered in this case reveals a very similar four (4x) cell construction contained inside the green plastic housing. The modified PMR recovered was considered well constructed and professionally made, especially with the added inclusion of a battery pack wire snap clip power connector. These similarities make it probable that these devices were constructed by the same individual. b. (S//REL) This PMR is similar to previously modified PMR radios recovered in the Paktya and Paktika Provinces covered in CEXC_AFG_786_07, 625, 417. While the same radio and similar DTMF modifications are found in those previously listed the components and construction of this device most closely resemble those found in CEXC_A_1001_07, found along the Pakistan border. Due to their lack of effectiveness on CF targets due to CM employed, limited numbers of PMR based devices are found in Khowst province. In this case it is probable that INS were specifically targeting ANSF personnel responding to another nearby IED detonation and those working in support of CF reconstruction projects. The victims of both attacks were transporting supplies for the construction of CF facilities. c. (S//REL) The damage to the construction truck is relatively limited in comparison to the effects of a TC6 mine however, as it was an RCIED the bomber had no control where the vehicle was driving and he chose to function the device when it was closest to the IED. Therefore it is possible that the main charge was a TC6 mine which was not functioned in the optimum place as the construction driver did not drive directly over the main charge. For furhter details please see attached CEXC Reports. NFTR. ***